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I. INTRODUCTION
Can a privately negotiated arbitration agreement deprive employees of
the statutory right to sue in court on claims of discrimination in employment
because of race, sex, religion, age, disability, and similar grounds prohibited
by federal law? Two leading U.S. Supreme Court decisions, decided almost
two decades apart, reached substantially different answers to this question-
and a!guably stood logic on its head in the process. In the earlier case of
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,1 involving arbitration under a collective
bargaining agreement, the Court held an adverse award did not preclude a
subsequent federal court action by the black grievant alleging racial
discrimination. But ten years ago, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp.,2 the Court ruled that an individual employee's agreement to arbitrate
all employment disputes prevented him from going to court with the claim he
was terminated on the basis of age.
Most disinterested observers have approved Gardner-Denver's rejection
of arbitral finality, but have denounced Gilmer's enforcement of a so-called
"mandatory arbitration" clause imposed on an employee as a condition of
employment.3 Yet, if different results were justified, a good argument can be
made from the perspective of voluntariness that the Supreme Court got it
backwards. The arbitration provision in Gardner-Denver was negotiated by
a union that was presumably more nearly equal in bargaining power to the
employer than the isolated employee in Gilmer. The latter had to sign what
was in effect a contract of adhesion. Nonetheless, however plausible may be
the abstract objections to mandatory arbitration, my thesis is that the
ordinary rank-and-file employee may well be better off as a practical matter
having assured access to an arbitrator rather than theoretical access to a
judge and jury. An increasing amount of empirical evidence suggests that is
true even for the individual employee in the nonunion setting. A fortiori, it
should be true for the employee represented by a union in the collective
bargaining situation. Employers, too, are likely to gain from the use of
arbitration instead of court litigation.
* James E. & Sarah A. Degan Professor Emeritus of Law, University of Michigan.
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
2 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
3 See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
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II. THE HOLDINGS OF GARDNER-DENVER AND GILMER
A quarter century ago the Supreme Court appeared to settle the question
of whether a private arbitration award could prevent an employee from later
pursuing a court action alleging a discriminatory discharge. In Gardner-
Denver a union had challenged the dismissal of a black worker as a violation
of the collective bargaining agreement. 4 At the arbitration hearing the
grievant asserted his dismissal was racially motivated, contrary to the labor
contract's nondiscrimination provision. The arbitrator ruled the employee
had been terminated for "just cause," but did not specifically address the
discrimination claim. 5 The employee first exhausted the administrative
procedures of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and
then sued the employer in federal district court under Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act.6 The Supreme Court rejected the employer's contentions
that the adverse arbitral award precluded judicial consideration of the
plaintiffis action on the grounds of collateral estoppel, res judicata, election
of remedies, and waiver, and allowed the suit to proceed. 7
The Court in Gardner-Denver emphasized that a Title VII litigant
vindicates the important congressional policy against employment
discrimination, while a party processing a claim through the grievance
procedure and arbitration merely enforces private contract rights. Moreover,
the arbitrator in this instance was only authorized to decide the contractual
issue of discrimination and not the statutory issue.8 Apparently the Court
was untroubled that the National Labor Relations Board routinely defers to
arbitrators' determinations concerning employees' rights under the National
Labor Relations Act.9 Perhaps the true reason for the approach in Gardner-
Denver was skepticism about the extent of a union's zeal, at least in the early
1970s, in pursuing Title VII discrimination claims in contrast to claims of
antiunion discrimination.
4 Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 38.
5 Id. at 42.
6 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
7 Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 59-60; see also Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight
Sys. Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 745 (1981) (employees not barred by arbitration award on wage
claim under union contract from suing under Fair Labor Standards Act). In Gardner-
Denver the Court noted that the arbitrator's award could be admitted in evidence in
subsequent court proceedings, and, if certain procedural safeguards were observed, it
could be accorded "great weight." 415 U.S. at 60 n.21.
8 Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 56-57.
9 See, e.g., Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955); Olin Corp., 268
N.L.R.B. 573, 573-77 (1984).
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Ten years ago the Supreme Court seemed to take a quite different tack
from Gardner-Denver. In the Gilmer case 0 it held that a securities
representative was bound by a contract with the.New York Stock Exchange
to arbitrate a claim of age discrimination against his employer, a brokerage
firm.11 Gardner-Denver could be distinguished because the arbitrator in
Gilmer was authorized to handle statutory as well as contractual disputes. 12
The earlier case was also said to involve a "tension" between union
representation and individual statutory rights. 13 The Court further stressed
that the Gilmer decision meant no loss of statutory rights; there was only a
change of forum.14 I
Especially notable, and maybe surprising, about the Court's position in
Gilmer was its willingness to reach out to endorse arbitration as a substitute
for litigation when that was hardly necessary. The case could just as well
have been decided on the conventional grounds that the plaintiff had failed
to exhaust his internal remedies. In Gilmer, unlike Gardner-Denver, there
had been no arbitration. 15 That underlines the significance of the Court's
acceptance of arbitration as a final dispute-resolution mechanism, even if
made a condition of employment. Nonetheless, it should not be overlooked
that the Court observed the stockbroker could still file a charge with the
EEOC. 16 The arbitration bar only applied to a court action by the individual
himself.
10 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
11 The conclusion that the employee's arbitration agreement was with the securities
exchanges, not with his employer, enabled the majority to skirt an important issue under
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which upholds the validity of written contracts
providing for arbitration. Section 1 of the FAA excludes-from its coverage the "contracts
of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994 & Supp. 2000). Most courts of
appeals have limited this exemption to employees in the transportation industries or
otherwise directly engaged in commerce, as distinguished from employees engaged in
industries simply affecting commerce. See cases cited in Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177
F.3d 1083, 1086 n.6 (9th Cir. 1999). The Ninth Circuit, the only circuit excluding all
contracts of employment from FAA coverage, was recently overruled. Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 121 S. Ct. 1302 (2001). Compare
Samuel Estreicher, Arbitration of Employment Disputes Without Unions, 66 CHI.-KENT.
L. REV. 753, 760-62 (1990), with Matthew W. Finkin, Commentary on "Arbitration of
Employment Disputes Without Union," 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 799,799-803.
12 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
131Id.
14 Id. at 26, 34.
15 1d. at 24.
16 Id. at 28. The courts of appeals are divided on whether the EEOC can seek both
equitable and monetary relief in the face of an individual's mandatory arbitration
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IL. DISTINcTioNs BETWEEN GARDNER-DENVER AND GILMER
As indicated, the Supreme Court in distinguishing Gilmer from
Gardner-Denver relied primarily on the difference in the arbitrator's
authority to decide statutory claims and the difference between individual
representation and collective representation. The difference in an arbitrator's
authority will mean little, however, if a union and an employer can provide
in their collective bargaining agreement that the arbitrator has the power to
resolve disputes concerning statutory as well as contractual rights. 17 There
may be more substance to the second distinction, as explained by Judge
Harry Edwards in Cole v. Bums International Security Services. 18 He
emphasized that in arbitrations pursuant to an individual contract of
employment, the employee decides whether and how to proceed, while in
arbitrations under a collective bargaining agreement, the union customarily
determines the course of action.19
Other distinctions between Gardner-Denver and Gilmer are possible.
Alleged racial discrimination in violation of Title VII was at issue in the
earlier case. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)20 was the
subject of Gilmer. Some of the most prominent legislative history of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 vigorously rejected any notion that arbitration
should be a substitute for Title VII's judicial procedures. 21 On the other
agreement, or whether it is limited to an equitable remedy to vindicate public policy.
Compare EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 1999) (both
remedies available), with EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298 (2d Cir. 1998),
and EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805 (4th Cir. 1999) (no monetary award
allowed). Cf Merrill Lynch, Inc. v. Nixon, 210 F.3d 814 (8th Cir. 2000) (state agency
immune under Eleventh Amendment from employer's action to enjoin the agency from
proceeding with employee's discrimination claims against employer after the alleged
victim had gone through arbitration).
17 In Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 80 (1998), the
Supreme Court held that any union-negotiated waiver of an employee's recourse to a
judicial forum had to be "clear and unmistakable."
18 Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
19 Id. at 1475-77.
20 Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 & Supp.
IV 1998).
21 Although section 118 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat.
1081 (1991), "encouraged" the use of alternative dispute resolution "[w]here appropriate
and to the extent authorized by law," the House Report emphasized that those ADR
procedures were only intended to "supplement" and not "supplant" Title VII rights and
remedies. H.R. Rep. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 97 (1991) (discussing H.R. 1, 102d Cong. (1st
Sess. 1991)). Two leading legislators limited or disavowed Gilmer. 137 CONG. REC.
S3021-02 (1991) (Sen. Dole: "where the parties knowingly and voluntarily elect to use
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hand, ADEA expressly permits waivers under certain prescribed
conditions.22 It might also be argued that the categories protected against
discrimination by Title VII (race, sex, religion, national origin) are more
sensitive than the discrimination because of age prohibited by ADEA.23
Advancing age is a stage all persons experience in normal course.
Most courts of appeals have regarded the critical distinction to be
between collective bargaining agreements (Gardner-Denver) and individual
employee contracts (Gilmer). They have generally upheld an employee's
agreement to arbitrate rather than sue, on Title VII claims as well as ADEA
claims,24 but have ruled against employers trying to prevent court actions on
the basis of a union-negotiated arbitration clause. 25 The Fourth Circuit
these [alternative] methods"; emphasis supplied); 137 CONG. REC. 30665 (1991) (Rep.
Edwards: "No approval whatsoever is intended of [Gilmer]"); cf. Duffield v. Robertson
Stephens & Co., 144 F. 3d 1182, 1194-97 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 precludes compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims). But most courts of appeals
have held that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not prevent the enforcement of
compulsory arbitration agreements. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999); Desidero v. National Ass'n of See. Dealers,
Inc., 191 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 1999); Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175 (3d Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 525 US. 1139 (1999); Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container,
Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996); Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts, 167 F.3d 361 (7th
Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 811 (1999).
22 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (1994) (waiver must be "knowing and voluntary").
23 The Supreme Court does not treat age as a "suspect" classification. Mass. Bd. of
Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312-14 (1976).
24 Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1479-86 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(holding that due process standards would have to be observed and that (2-1) the
employer would have to pay all the arbitrator's fees); Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 21
(arbitration not enforced on facts of case); Seus, 146 F.3d at 175; Rojas v. TK
Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745 (5th Cir. 1996); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991); Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts. Inc., 167 F.3d 361 (7th
Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 811 (1999); Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113
F.3d 832 (8th Cir. 1997); Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 39 F.3d 1482
(10th Cir. 1994); Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2000).
But see Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1189-90 (holding the Civil Rights Act of 1991 prevents
individual waiver of right to sue under Title VII). For a recent overview of the cases, see
Charles J. Coleman, Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Issues: Austin, Wright, and the
Future, in ARBITRATION 1998: THE CHANGING WORLD OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 51ST ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS
134 (Steven Briggs & JayE. Grenig eds. 1999).
25 Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 1997); Varner v. National
Super Mkts., 94 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 1996); Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp.,
117 F.3d 519 (1lth Cir. 1997). Cf. Haskins v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 230 F.3d 231
(6th Cir. 2000) (employee's rights under union contract did not preclude enforcement of
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stands alone in concluding that Gilmer has superseded Gardner-Denver even
with regard to collective bargaining agreements. 26 On its facts, the Fourth
Circuit holding could also be explained as involving a failure to exhaust
internal remedies. Like the employee in Gilmer, but unlike the one in
Gardner-Denver, the plaintiff in the Fourth Circuit case had not invoked an
available arbitration procedure before bringing suit.27
IV. THE PROS AND CONS OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION
The case against mandatory arbitration of statutory claims is easy to
state, and it is powerful. Congress, or some other legislative body, has
prohibited various types of employment discrimination and has prescribed
certain procedures for the vindication of those statutory rights. The specified
procedures, sometimes including the right to a jury trial, may be almost as
important as the substantive rights themselves. No employer, acting either
alone or in conjunction with a union, should be able to force an employee to
waive the statutorily provided forum and procedures as the price of getting
or keeping a job. Conditioning employment on the surrender of statutory
entitlements would seem a blatant affront to public policy. Furthermore, one
can say than an employer dealing with an individual employee is the "repeat
player" against the one-timer, and invariably much more knowledgeable
about both the arbitration forum and the arbitrator cadre.
When the rights involved are as sensitive as guarantees against
discrimination because of race, sex, religion, ethnicity, age, and disability,
the arguments against dilution of statutory claims are all the stronger.
Numerous scholars and public and private bodies have accordingly
condemned the use of mandatory arbitration. 28 In addition, it was been
contended that some sizable, well-publicized jury verdicts could do much
more to deter workplace discrimination than any number of smaller,
his separate agreement with securities exchanges to arbitrate all disputes with his
employer).
26 See Austin, 78 F.3d at 875.
27 Id. at 879.
28 See, e.g., David E. Feller, Fender Bender or Train Wreck?: The Collision
Between Statutory Protection of Individual Employee Rights and the Judicial Revision of
the Federal Arbitration Act, 41 ST. Louis U. L.J. 561 (1997); Joseph R. Grodin,
Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine and Policy in the Wake of
Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1 (1996); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory
Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73
DENY. U. L. REv. 1017 (1996); see also infra notes 31-32, 35-39 and accompanying
text.
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confidential arbitration awards.29 Judge Harry Edwards has also observed
that the diversion of a large amount of civil rights litigation from the courts
to arbitration, with the resulting decrease in the number of published judiciai
opinions, could have an enervating effect on the development of legal
doctrine in this area.30
Besides the academic scholars, two federal agencies and two prestigious
private bodies have gone on record as opposed to mandatory arbitration of
statutory employment claims. The, EEOC declared in a 1995 policy
statement: "[P]arties must knowingly, willingly, and voluntarily enter into an
ADR proceeding." 31 According to the EEOC, an employee should be able to
withdraw from an arbitration any time before a decision is rendered. 32 But
Gilmer can be regarded at best as involving a "knowing" agreement on the
employee's part.33 It was hardly "voluntary" in the EEOC sense of the
word.34 The General Counsel of the.National Labor Relations Board seemed
29 See, e.g., Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims: Rights "Waived"
and Lost in the Arbitration Forum; i3 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 381, 429-31 (1996). Arbitral
awards are traditionally not published unless all parties consent.
30 Harry T. Edwards, Where Are We Heading with Mandatory Arbitration of
Statutory Claims in Employment? 16 GA. ST. U. L. REv, 293, 297 (1999).
31 EEOC: Alternative Dispute Resolution Policy, 8 Lab. Rel. Rep: (BNA) 405:7301,
405:7302 (July 7, 1997) [hereinafter ADR Policy]. In July 1997, the EEOC issued, a
longer and even stronger condemnation of compulsory arbitration or pre-dispute
agreements to arbitrate, declaring that "even the best arbitral systems do not afford the
benefits of the judicial system." EEOC: Mandatory Arbitration of Employment
Discrimination Disputes as a Condition of Employment, 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA)
405:7511, 405:7520 (July 7, 1997) [hereinafter Mandatory Arbitration].
32 ADR Policy, supra note 31, at 405:7302.
33 The federal courts have used at least three different approaches'to the necessary
state of mind for holding an employee bound by an agreement to arbitrate. See Haskins v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 230 F.3d 231,235-39 (6th Cir. 2000) cert. denied, 121 S. Ct.
859 (2001). One view is that the employee must "knowingly" agree to arbitrate.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir. 1994). Another is that the
employee is accountable, absent fraud or duress or other standard contractual defenses,
for the provisions in the writing he or she signs. Haskins, 230 F.3d at 238-39. There is an
intermediate position, denying enforcement. of the arbitration agreement when that is
"appropriate." Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 20
(1st Cir. 1999) (employer failed to familiarize plaintiff emplbyee with arbitration rules).
34 EEOC apparently treats all employee agreements to arbitrate before a dispute has
actually arisen (so-called "pre-dispute" agreements) as "involuntary." See Mandatory
Arbitration, supra note 31, at 405:7520. The notion is that at such a time a worker's
whole concern is being hired or pleasing the boss, and there is no freely expressed
consent to arbitration. After a dispute has occurred, however, employees may have little
to lose by opposing the employer (they are likely to have been discharged), and, in any
497
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ready at one point to issue unfair labor practice complaints against any effort
to impose mandatory arbitration agreements, but later that was apparently
limited to attempts to prevent the filing of charges with the NLRB.35
The Dunlop Commission on the Future of Worker-Management
Relations stated in its December 1994 Report: "[A]ny choice between
available methods for enforcing statutory employment rights should be left
to the individual who feels wronged rather than dictated by his or her
employment contract. '36 The Commission hinted at the possibility of more
flexibility in the future, however, by suggesting that the issue be revisited
after there was more experience with the arbitration of statutory claims.37
The country's foremost organization of professional labor arbitrators, the
National Academy of Arbitrators, has officially expressed its opposition to
"mandatory employment arbitration as a condition of employment when it
requires waiver of direct access to either a judicial or administrative forum
for the pursuit of statutory rights. '38 But the Academy added that, given the
present state of the law, its members could serve as arbitrators in such cases.
Members nonetheless were advised to observe certain guidelines as to the
fairness of these procedures. 39 A broadly constituted Task Force sponsored
by the American Bar Association took no position in a May 1995 "Protocol"
concerning the timing (pre-dispute or post-dispute 4°) of arbitration
event, they act with a heightened awareness of the consequences. That probably explains
why EEOC believes "post-dispute" agreements may be truly voluntary.
35 See Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
3 6 COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, U.S. DEP'TS
OF COMMERCE AND LABOR, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 33 (1994) [hereinafter
COMMISSION].
37Id
3 8 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, Statement on Condition of Employment
Agreements, in ARITRATION 1997: THE NExT FIFTY YEARS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
FIFrIETH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS app. at 312 (Joyce
M. Najita ed., 1998).
39 Id.
40 Management representatives testified before the Dunlop Commission that
employers would generally not be willing to enter into post-dispute agreements to
arbitrate. See COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, U.S.
DEP'TS OF COMMERCE AND LABOR, FACT FINDING REPORT 118 (1994). Employers will
wait out most small claims, assuming employees will not be able to pursue them. See
infra note 42 and accompanying text. Conversely, employees and their lawyers will be
unlikely to agree to arbitrate the big case rather than get it before a judge and jury. Pre-
dispute agreements to arbitrate, when neither party knows what may later occur, are the
most realistic for both sides.
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agreements-and thus effectively their "voluntariness" 41-but it did agree
they should be "knowingly made."42
The opposition to mandatory arbitration, formidable as it is, may not be
the last word. Facts have an ornery way of upending theoretical constructs.
Highly pragmatic considerations indicate that the ordinary rank-and-file
worker may be better off with the actuality of arbitration, even of the
mandatory variety, than with the beguiling, but often illusory, possibility of a
court suit. Experienced plaintiffs' attorneys have estimated that only about
5% of the individuals with an employment claim who seek help from, the
private bar are able to obtain counsel. 43 One of the Detroit area's top
employment specialists was more precise in a conversation with me. His
secretary kept an actual count; he took on one out of eighty-seven persons
who contacted him for possible representation. Of course, some of those who
are rejected will not have meritorious claims. But others will be workers
whose potential dollar recovery will simply not justify the investment of the
time and money of a first-rate lawyer in preparing a court action. For those
individuals, the cheaper, simpler process of arbitration is the most feasible
recourse. It will cost a lawyer far less time and effort to take a case to
arbitration; at worst, claimants can represent themselves or be represented by
laypersons in this much less formal and intimidating forum. In the unionized
context, arbitration is far more readily available, with the collective
bargaining agent supplying representation.
The employee with a minimal claim is likely to find little relief from the
EEOC. Before a severely overburdened and under-funded Commission
resorted to its "triage" procedure a few years ago, classifying cases as "A,"
"B," or "C" priorities, depending on merit and importance, and tossing out
many charges after the briefest of investigations, its backlog had soared past
100,000, and it was receiving almost 100,000 new charges a year.44 The
41 See supra note 34.
4 2 TASK FORCE ON ALTERNATIVE DIsPuTE RESOLUTION IN EMPLOYMENT, A DuE
PROCESS PROTOCOL FOR MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY DIsPUTES ARISING
OUT OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP (1995), reprinted in DIsP. RESOL. J., Oct.-Dec.
1995, at 37-39, available at http://www/adr.org/education/education/protocol.html (May
9, 1995) [hereinafter PROTOCOL]; The Task Force consisted of management, union, and
plaintiffs' attorneys from the American Bar Association and the National Employment
Lawyers Association, and representatives of the American Arbitration Association, the
American Civil Liberties Union, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, the
National Academy of Arbitrators, and the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution.
43 Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30
COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REv. 29, 58 (1998).
44 149 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 13, 14 (May 1, 1995); 151 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 143,
156 (Feb. 5, 1996).
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situation was so bleak that one knowledgeable scholar recommended, quite
understandably, that the EEOC get out of the business of handling individual
charges and husband its limited resources for routing out systemic unlawful
practices. 45 At best, the Commission tends to concentrate on the big case or
the test case.
If claimants are able to sue in court, there is no reason to think they will
be better off than in arbitration. Several studies show that employees actually
prevail more often in arbitration than in court. The American Arbitration
Association, in one study, found a winning rate of 63% for arbitral
claimants.46 In a much-criticized system operated by the securities industry,
employees still prevailed 55% of the time, according to the U.S. General
Accounting Office.47 By contrast, claimants' success rates in separate
surveys of federal court and EEOC cases were only 14.9% and 16.8%,
respectively.48 Even if the latter figures are somewhat skewed because they
may omit pretrial settlements, the relative attractiveness of arbitration for
claimants cannot be denied. 49 As might be expected, successful plaintiffs
obtain larger awards from judges or juries. But claimants as a group recover
more in arbitration.50 All these statistics reflect the situation before the
ABA's Due Process Protocol was adopted, when many flawed systems were
in existence. Arbitration procedures should be even more favorable for
employees now.
45 Maurice E.R. Munroe, The EEOC: Pattern and Practice Imperfect, 13 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 219 (1995).
46 Maltby, supra note 43, at 46.
47 Id. at 50. The National Association of Securities' Dealers Office of Dispute
Resolution, which administers over 5,000 arbitrations a year, recently reported that an
independent survey by two college professors indicated that about 93% of the
participants who answered a questionnaire (54% were claimants) concluded their cases
were handled "fairly and without bias." Press Release, NASD Regulation, Inc., NASD
Arbitration Forum Overwhelmingly Praised for Fairness According to Independent
Survey (Aug. 5, 1999) (on file with the Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution), at
http://www.nasdadr.com/news/prl 999/nesection99_196.html.
48 Maltby, supra note 43, at 49.
49 Cf Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage from Using
Mandatory Arbitration for Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS L. J. 399, 418-62 (2000).
For more sympathetic treatments of mandatory arbitration than those provided by the first
wave of academic commentators, see Richard A. Bales, Creating and Challenging
Compulsory Arbitration Agreements, 13 LAB. LAW. 511 (1998); Samuel Estreicher, Pre-
dispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1182
(1997); Susan A. FitzGibbon, Reflections on Gilmer and Cole, 1 EMPLOYEE RTS. &
EMPLOYEE POLICY J. 221 (1997).
50 Maltby, supra note 43, at 54.
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Delay in securing relief can be devastating for the fired worker without a
job or with a much-reduced income. Most court dockets, both federal and
state, are heavily backlogged and delay is almost invariably greater than in
arbitration. A more conservative judiciary than existed in earlier -years,
especially among occupants of the federal bench, may be all too willing to
grant summary judgment against those civil rights plaintiffs who do manage
to file suit. In contrast, traditional labor arbitrators must remain mutually
acceptable to unions and employers, and the same should become true for
arbitrators in the new employer-individual employee field as an increasingly
savvy plaintiffs' bar develops. No comparable check exists on the lifetime
appointees to the federal judiciary or, as a practical matter, on longtime
incumbents of state courts.
Even for the individual employee, let alone the unionized worker backed
up by a labor organization, the accumulating empirical data about the actual
experience of discrimination victims in the arbitral forum are largely
positive. At the very least, they suggest considerable caution in dismissing
arbitration, whether voluntary or mandatory, as an alternative to court
litigation for the vindication of employees' statutory civil rights.
V. ARBITRATION IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Gardner-Defiver,51 the seminal Supreme Court case on arbitration as an
alternative to civil rights litigation in the courts, involved an employee who
had arbitrated his claim of employment discrimination under a union-
management contract. Most of the subsequent cases in the lower courts,
however, have dealt with an individual employee's agreement to. arbitrate. 52
The Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer,53 sustaining such individual
commitments generally, raised the question whether Gardner-Denver was
still good law in holding that arbitration in the collective bargaining context
did not preclude a later resort to the courts on a statutory claim of
discrimination.54
51 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1074); see supra notes 4-8 and
accompanying text.
52 See supra note 24 and cases cited.
53 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20(1991); see supra notes 10-
16 and accompanying text.
54 See, e.g., Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir.
1996) (holding that Gilmer superseded Gardner-Denver). For decisions to the contrary,
see supra note 25.
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The Supreme Court has made at least one thing clear. In Wright v.
Universal Maritime Service Corp., 55 the Court declared that any union-
negotiated waiver of employees' statutory right to a judicial forum would
have to be "clear and unmistakable." But the Court expressly left open
whether "Gardner-Denver's seemingly absolute prohibition of union waiver
of employees' federal forum rights survives Gilmer. '56
The first question that needs to be addressed is the intent of the union
and the employer in providing for arbitration in their labor contract. As the
Supreme Court seems to have recognized in Wright, it would be a mistake
to assume that an arbitration provision automatically constitutes a union
attempt to waive an employee's right to invoke administrative or judicial
procedures provided by a statute, either instead of or after pursuing
grievance and arbitration procedures provided by the collective agreement.
The "standard form" arbitration provision covers all disputes between the
parties "as to the meaning, interpretation and application of the provisions
of this agreement. '57 A particular labor contract may not prohibit
discrimination because of race, sex, religion, age, and so on. Even if it does,
was the intent of the parties merely to add a substantive contractual right (as
in Gardner-Denver), rather than to confine employees to the contractual
grievance and arbitration procedures for both contractual and statutory
claims (by analogy to Gilmer)?
Gardner-Denver has been on the books for over a quarter century. In
light of that, the assumption ought surely to be that union and management
negotiators did not intend to waive employees' rights to a statutory forum in
the absence of what Wright characterized as a "clear and unmistakable"
expression to that effect. Union representatives have informed me privately
that most labor organizations would be extremely reluctant at this time to
enter into such an agreement. The reasons are due partly to internal politics
and partly to ingrained convictions about basic fairness. Gardner-Denver
gives employees what appears the best of both worlds; they can arbitrate
their contractual claims and reserve the right to sue on their statutory claims.
Some employees will be vociferous in resisting any shift in the status quo.
Yet I can imagine a change of heart if the relatively high success rate and
55 Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 80 (1998) (emphasis
added).
56 Id. For analysis from an academic and a union point of view, see Stuart L. Bass,
What the Courts Say About Mandatory Arbitration, DisP. RESOL. J., Nov. 1999, at 24;
Leonard D. Polletta, What's Left After Wright?: Do Employees Still Have Two Bites at
the Apple?, DisP. RESOL. J., Nov. 1999, at 48.
57 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 565 (1960)
(emphasis added).
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greater accessibility of arbitration continues and knowledge about it spreads;
if the courts (especially the federal courts) are increasingly unreceptive to
discrimination claims and increasingly willing to accept prior adverse
arbitration awards as determinative; 58 and if employers begin to press for
finality by making arbitration 'mandatory and preclusive of court actions, in
return for an enticing quid pro quo for the union and the work force as a
whole. That would squarely present the issue of the validity of union waivers
of employees' rights to statutory forums.59
Let us suppose, then, that after due deliberation and perhaps for some
appropriate return, a union agrees with an employer that their grievance and
arbitration procedures shall apply to employees' discrimination claims under
civil rights statutes as well as under the collective contract. Furthermore,
these internal procedures are to be the sole and exclusive method for
enforcing both contractual and statutory rights, and the results of any
arbitration will be final and binding on the union, the employer, and the
employees. 60 If the union is treated as the ,authorized representative of the
employees, 6 1 this negotiation would seem far more "knowing" and
"voluntary" than what occurs when an employer presents a new or
incumbent individual worker, like Robert Gilmer, with a mandatory
58 The now famous footnote 21 of Gardner-Denver authorizes courts to admit and
accord "great weight" to arbital awards, depending on such factors as "the existence of
provisions in the collective-bargaining agreement that conform substantially with Title
VII, the degree of procedural fairness in the arbitral forum, adequacy of the record with
respect to the issue of discrimination .... the special competence of particular
arbitrators ... [and] an arbitral determination [that] gives full consideration to an
employee's Title VII rights." Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60 n.21
(1974).
59 Justice Scalia, speaking for the Court in Wright, distinguished between "an
individual's waiver of his own rights [Gilmer], rather than a union's waiver of the rights
of represented employees [Gardner-Denver]." 525 U.S. at 80.
60 There is current legal authority that a collective bargaining provision conditioning
access to an employer's grievance and arbitration procedure on an employee's waiver of
the right to file statutory charges may constitute "retaliation" under the civil rights laws.
See, e.g., EEOC v. Ill. Bd. of Governors, 957 F.2d 424, 429-30 (7th Cir. 1992) (action
under ADEA). This decision could be limited to ensuring an employee's right to file
charges with the EEOC. See supra text at note 16.
61 The National Labor Relations Act makes the representatives selected by the
majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit the "exclusive representatives
of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to
rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment." 29
U.S.C. § 159(a) (1994 & Supp. 2000). See, e.g., ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON
LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 374-81 (1976); THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COuRTs, AND THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT 376-88 (Patrick Hardin et. al. eds., 3d ed. 1992).
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arbitration agreement on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Except for such persons
as the superstar athlete, the network news anchor, or the high-ranking
corporate executive, the isolated employee will ordinarily have nowhere near
the bargaining power of a labor organization in dealing with an employer.62
In terms of voluntariness, at least, the Gardner-Denver (collective
bargaining) situation appears much more acceptable than the Gilmer
(individual employee) situation. Failure to recognize the difference might
indeed suggest that the Supreme Court got it backwards in the two cases.
Voluntariness in the negotiation, however, is not the only consideration.
The fairness and effectiveness of the union's representation must also be
taken into account. There will be those who would question-as the
Supreme Court may have questioned in Gardner-Denver in the early
1970s-the ardor of a white-male-dominated labor organization in
championing blacks, women, and other minorities. 63 Yet the duty of fair
representation, 64 enforceable under the National Labor Relations Act by
both the courts 65 and the National Labor Relations Board,66 requires unions
"to serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrimination
toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty,
62 GORMAN, supra note 61, at 379 ("Congress intended [in the National Labor
Relations Act] to substitute the strength of the collectivity for the weakness of the
individual bargainer").
63 See WILLIAM B. GOULD, BLACK WORKERS IN WHITE UNIONS: JOB
DISCRIMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES 424-30 (1977).
64 See, e.g., THE CHANGING LAW OF FAIR REPRESENTATION (Jean T. McKelvey ed.,
1985) [hereinafter FAIR REPRESENTATION].
65 Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S.
335 (1964); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.,
424 U.S. 554 (1976). The duty of fair representation was first enunciated in Steele v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), a case arising under the Railway
Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63, 181-88 (1994 & Supp. 2000), and involving racial
discrimination by a union representing railroad firemen; see also Glover v. St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry. Co., 393 U.S. 324 (1969) (plaintiffs in court action charging racial
discrimination need not exhaust grievance and arbitration remedies when employer and
unions were allegedly scheming together to bar blacks from promotion); Air Line Pilots
Ass'n, Int'l v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65 (1991) (behavior of the union must be so "outside a
wide range of reasonableness" that it is irrational for a union's actions in order to be
considered arbitrary and in breach of its duty of fair representation); Matthew W. Finkin,
The Limits of Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 64 MINN. L. REV. 183 (1980);
Clyde W. Summers, The Individual Employee's Rights Under the Collective Agreement:
What Constitutes Fair Representation? 126 U. PA. L. REV. 251 (1977).
66 Local Union No. 12, United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers v.
NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Int'l. Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local No.
1581, 489 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1974); Pac. Mar. Ass'n, 209 N.L.R.B. 519 (1974).
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and to avoid arbitrary conduct. '67 Title VII and the other civil rights statutes
provide further protection against union discrimination because of race, sex,
religion, ethnicity, age, and disability.68 Almost any experienced labor
arbitrator can attest that labor organizations do not take these obligations
lightly. Unions frequently appear to bring cases to arbitration primarily for
the purpose of avoiding the possibility of liability (and a jury's award of
damages) under either the duty of fair representation or civil rights
legislation.69
Professor Sarah Rudolph Cole proffers another reason for labor unions'
attentiveness to the needs and concerns of minority members. Relying on
modem public choice theory, she points out that any elective body naturally
responds to the special interests of any group who can organize easily by
identifying similarly situated individuals.70  As examples of this
disproportionate influence in the union setting, she cites the widespread
inclusion of nondiscrimination clauses in' collective bargaining agreements,
fetal protection policies, union promotion of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, and labor support for affirmative action policies.71 While conceding
that "historically, unions were hardly thought of as protectors of minority
rights," Professor Cole concludes with the prediction that today "agreements
to arbitrate statutory claims would not be included in collective bargaining
agreements if the well-organized protected groups believed that such
agreements were not in their best interest."72
Can union-management arbitration effectively enforce employees' rights
against discrimination? On this score the comments of an eminent trio of
federal judges are reassuring. Judges Har.y Edwards of the District of
Columbia Circuit, Betty Fletcher of the Ninth Circuit, and Alvin Rubin of
the Fifth Circuit have all stressed arbitration's merits of speed, cost savings,
67 Vaca, 386 U.S. at 177.
68 In addition to Title VII and ADEA, see Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117, 12201-12213 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). See BARBARA
LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DIsCRIMINATION LAW (Paul W. Cane, Jr.
et al. eds., 3d ed. 1996 & Supp. 2000); CHARLES A. SULLIVAN et al., EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1988).
69 Samuel Estreicher, Freedom of Contract and Labor Lav Reform: Opening Up the
Possibilities for Value-Added Unionism, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 827, 844 (1996); see also
Clyde W. Summers, Individual Rights in Arbitration, in ARBITRATION IN PRACTICE 142,
144 (Arnold M. Zack ed., 1984).
70 Sarah Rudolph Cole, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the (Alternative)
Forum: Reexamining Alexander v. Gardner-Denver in the Wake of Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 1997 BYU L. REV. 591, 600-01.
71 Id. at 601-02.
72 Id at 602, 605.
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and relative informality.73 They specifically lauded these advantages of
arbitration over litigation, even in vindicating statutory rights against
discrimination. None of these endorsements, it must be emphasized, dealt
with mandatory arbitration. But they should at least quiet the doubts often
expressed about the capability of trained arbitrators to resolve the statutory
interpretive problems presented in the usual discrimination case. Implicit in
this favorable assessment of the arbitral process by the three judges must be
the conviction that unions are generally able and conscientious employee
advocates. 74 Labor organizations are also "repeat players" in arbitration, no
less than employers, with an equivalent insight into the operations of the
workplace.
One further, absolutely vital, set of conditions must apply to any
mandatory arbitration scheme, whether individually or collectively
negotiated. The employee must be accorded due process. A reasonable
consensus has developed about the procedural requirements for a fair
individual arbitration, voluntary or otherwise. Both the Dunlop Commission
Report and the Due Process Protocol of the ABA Task Force came up with
very similar lists of procedural guarantees. They include the following:
73 Harry T. Edwards, Advantages of Arbitration over Litigation: Reflections of a
Judge, in ARBITRATION 1982: CONDUCT OF THE HEARING, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-
FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 16, 27-28 (James L.
Stem & Barbara D. Dennis eds., 1983); Betty Binns Fletcher, Arbitration of Title VII
Claims: Some Judicial Perceptions, in ARBITRATION ISSUES FOR THE 1980S,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
ARBITRATORS 218, 228 (James L. Stem & Barbara D. Dennis eds., 1982); Alvin B.
Rubin, Arbitration: Toward a Rebirth, in TRUTH, LIE DETECTORS, AND OTHER PROBLEMS
IN LABOR ARBITRATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FIRST ANNUAL MEETING,
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 30, 38 (James L. Stem & Barbara D. Dennis eds.,
1979) [hereinafter TRUTH].
74 It must be acknowledged that in routine cases union representation can
occasionally be inadequate, probably because of overwork and lack of time. Russell A.
Smith, The Search for Truth-The Whole Truth, in TRUTH, supra note 73, at 40, 45. But
in my experience, and that of arbitrator colleagues with whom I have discussed the
matter, a serious discrimination claim elicits the most careful union preparation, often by
a lawyer with special expertise in the area.
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1. A jointly selected neutral arbitrator who knows the law.
2. Simple, adequate discovery.
3. Cost-sharing to ensure arbitrator neutrality.75
4. Representation by a person of the employee's choice.
5. Remedies equal to those provided by the law.
6. A written opinion and award, with reasons.
7. Limited judicial review, concentrating on the law.76
These standards would need only slight adaptation for application to the
collective bargaining context. Joint union-management selection of an
75 In Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1468 (D.C. Cir. 1997), the court
required (2-1) the employer to pay all the arbitrator's fees as a condition for enforcing an
individual employee's Waiver of a judicial forum. Surely Judge Edwards, speaking for
the majority, was right that the source of payment is not the key to arbitrator neutrality.
Id. at 1485. Arbitrators are naturally concerned about getting their fee but,'ordinarily, not
about where it comes from. Id. Individual employees, of course, may feel more
comfortable paying part of the arbitrator's fee, being unable to accept the notion there is
no connection between the source of payment and a potential bias on the part of the
decision-maker.
The more sensitive problem, at least as a matter of appearances, is who chooses the
arbitrator. Employers are far more likely to be repeat players in arbitration than
employees. Id. Thus, an arbitrator's continuing acceptability probably turns more on
employer than employee attitudes. Id. This is not a matter on which the source of
payment is going to have much effect. One has to count primarily on the inherent
integrity of the great body of arbitrators-and on their knowledge that recognition of that
integrity in the labor-management community is indispensable for their capacity to
practice.
Cole may have gone too far in insisting that the employer pay all the arbitrator's fee.
Access to a court, at least initially, would ordinarily not be cost-free. Id. at 1484. Some
modest but reasonable (a maximum of one week's pay?) sharing of the arbitrator's
charges may serve as a realistic deterrent to an employee's filing of frivolous claims. If
the employee ultimately prevails, then the arbitrator, like a court, could apportion fees
and costs accordingly.
Fortunately, none of these justifiable concerns about the role of payments to the
arbitrator-and their potentially inhibiting effects upon access to arbitration by individual
employees-should have anywhere near as much significance in the union setting. Equal
sharing of arbitration costs by the union and the employer is the customary arrangement.
FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, How ARBrrRATION WORKS 25 (Marlin M.
Volz & Edward P. Goggin eds., 5th ed. 1997) [hereinafter ELKOURI].
76 COMMISSION, supra note 36, at 118-19; PROTOCOL, supra note 42, at 38-39. The
Fourth Circuit, ordinarily most receptive to arbitration in place of court litigation,
nonetheless refused to enforce an agreement to arbitrate a claim of sexual harassment
when the employer's unilaterally established procedures were "so one-sided that their
only possible purpose [was] to undermine the neutrality of the proceeding." Hooters of
Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938 (4th Cir. 1999).
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arbitrator is almost invariable and cost-sharing is the norm.77 Formal
discovery is relatively rare, because the more informal grievance procedure
preceding arbitration generally results in substantial disclosure.78
Representation is somewhat more ticklish. While an exclusive bargaining
agent is by definition the choice of the majority of the employees in an
appropriate unit,79 that does not mean that individual grievants are always
satisfied with the union as their representative. Some may want personal
counsel, especially if they are members of a minority and are charging some
form of discrimination. 80 Nonetheless, I believe the fourth condition of
"representation by a person of the employee's choice" should be satisfied by
the agency of their union, acting subject to its duty of fair representation 8'
and subject to the employee's right to bypass arbitration upon a credible
claim of union complicity.82 The federal courts are in accord.83
A major change that has to be made in conventional collective
bargaining arbitration to accommodate statutory claims is authorizing
remedies "equal to those provided by the law." The traditional remedy in
labor arbitration for a wrongfully discharged or disciplined employee is
reinstatement with or without back pay, but not general damages. 84 Under
Title VII, however, intentional unlawful discrimination is subject to the
award of compensatory damages, and malicious discrimination to punitive
damages as well.85 The parties' submission of a statutory discrimination
77 ELKOURI, supra note 75, at 25, 184. If the parties cannot agree on an arbitrator,
they may delegate the choice to an appointing agency, such as the American Arbitration
Association. Id. at 186. Occasionally, the parties provide that the loser pays the
arbitrator's fees. Id. at 25.
78 Id. at 217-20.
79 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
80 Gerald Aksen, Post-Gardner-Denver Developments in Arbitration Lenv, in
ARBITRATION 1975: PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING,
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 24, 55-58 (Barbara D. Dennis & Gerald G.
Somers eds., 1976); Robert J. Rabin, Fair Representation in Arbitration, in FAIR
REPRESENTATION, supra note 64, at 173, 198-200.
81 See supra text at notes 64-70.
82 See supra note 65 and accompanying text on Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco
Ry. Co., 393 U.S. 324 (1969).
83 E.g., Garcia v. Zenith Electronics Corp., 58 F.3d 1171, 1179-81 (7th Cir. 1995);
Castelli v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 752 F.2d 1480, 1483-84 (9th Cir. 1985).
84 ELKOURI, supra note 75, at 939; David E. Feller, Remedies in Arbitration: Old
Problems Revisited, in ARBITRATION ISSUES FOR THE 1980s, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
THIRTY-FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 109, 111-12,
116-18 (James L. Stem & Barbara D. Dennis eds., 1982).
85 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994 & Supp. 2000).
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claim to arbitration should implicitly empower the arbitrator to award the
remedies available under the statute, but an express statement to that effect
would be preferable.
The requirement of written, reasoned opinions by arbitrators should pose
no new problems. Most unions, employers, and arbitrators favor them even
in ordinary contract disputes. 86 I think it inevitable, and probably not
undesirable, that courts will subject arbitral awards dealing with" statutory
rights to a somewhat -more searching review on the law than has been the
practice with awards dealing only with contractual rights. 87 Courts are going
to retain the power to prevent an arbitrator from mangling an employee's
statutory protections against discrimination. This may somewhat diminish
the finality usually accorded arbitrators' awards, but nowhere near as much
as an entirely separate court action on the statutory claim.
Employer enthusiasm for mandatory arbitration, even for individual
employees, is not all that it was in the past.88 Management has become
aware of the greater accessibility of arbitration for employees, and of their
greater success rate there than in court litigation.89 Still, combining the
arbitration of statutory and contractual claims would offer certain obvious
advantages for unionized employers, beyond those available for their
nonunion peers. A union employee alleging discrimination is ordinarily able
to arbitrate a discharge or other discipline under the collective bargaining
agreement's "just cause" provision, regardless of whether there is a separate
nondiscrimination clause. Making arbitration the exclusive forum for all
discrimination claims would relieve the employer of the threat of the six-or-
seven-figure award that is much likelier to come from a jury than an
arbitrator.90 Litigation counsel across the country tell me that even a
86 ELKOURI, supra note 75, at 384.
87 For the limited nature of judicial review of arbitration awards in traditional U.S.
collective bargaining disputes, see United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); E. Associated Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 17,
121 S. Ct. 462 (2000).
88 See, e.g., Green, supra note 49, at 418-62; Daniel B. Tukel, To Arbitrate or Not
to Arbitrate Discrimination Claims: That is Now the Question for Michigan Employers,
79 MICH. Bus. L.J. 1206, 1207-08 (2000).
89 See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
90 See supra text at notes 49-50. Individual plaintiffs in wrongful discharge cases
have been awarded $20 million, $4.7 million, $3.25 million, $2.75 million, $2 million,
$1.5 million, $1.19 million, and $1 million. Kenneth Lopatka & Julia Martin,
Developments in the Law of Wrongful Discharge, in AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, INSTITUTE
ON LITIGATING WRONGFUL DISCHARGE, AND INVASION OF PRIVACY CLAIMS vii, 13-18
(1986). The mean damages awarded by federal district courts in the mid-1990s in
discrimination cases was $530,611. Maltby, supra note 43, at 47, 49.
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successful defense in a jury trial may cost $100,000 to $200,00, and a
complex discrimination case may run into the millions. I have little doubt
that, if unions and the employees they represent were willing, the vast
majority of employers would happily accept arbitration as the exclusive
forum for resolving all discrimination claims.
VI. CONCLUSION
According to the ideology of voluntarism-and voluntarism is a good
ideology, as ideologies go-there is a strong case against mandatory
arbitration for individual employees. Typically, a company will present a
solitary job applicant, as part of the hiring process, with a sheaf of papers to
sign. Among them will be a form requiring all employment disputes,
including statutory claims, to be submitted to final and binding arbitration.
This waiver of any right to a court action will be made a condition of getting
the job. The employee's consent in such circumstances may often not be
"knowing." It can hardly be called "voluntary" in any meaningful sense. For
many persons, such a scenario is enough to establish that the employee's
agreement to arbitrate statutory claims and surrender the right to a judicial
forum is invalid as contrary to the public policy embodied in
nondiscrimination legislation.
Even for the individual employee, however, there is another side to the
story. Pragmatically, the assembly-line worker or retail clerk may actually be
better off by being entitled to arbitrate statutory claims, despite the price of
losing the capacity to bring a court suit. As has been shown, access to
arbitration is easier in the run-of-the-mill discrimination case, with a job but
only a few dollars at stake, and employees are likelier to win in arbitration
than in court.91 What is truly at issue is the opportunity for the professional
employee or middle-range executive to secure an occasional bonanza from a
jury against the most realistic chance for the mass of rank-and-file workers
to get their jobs back through arbitration. I would opt for the greater good for
the greater number.
When it comes to the collective bargaining context, where a union
representing the majority of the employees may have agreed with an
employer to make arbitration the exclusive forum for vindicating statutory
rights, I find objections even on the grounds of ideology ring hollow. The
basic concern about voluntariness is met by the exclusive bargaining
authority of the union.92 Questions about the readiness of labor organizations
91 See supra text at notes 43 and 46-50.
92 See supra note 61-62 and accompanying text.
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to treat their minority members evenhandedly, if not preferentially, are
answered by the formal guarantees of the duty of fair representation and
Title VI193 and by the actuality of observed union behavior.94 Like
employers, unions are repeat players in the arbitration process, and they are
generally skilled in the representation of employee interests.
If unions and employers are going to be prohibited from making
arbitration the sole recourse of an employee alleging job discrimination,
there has to be something inherently defective in such an arrangement.
Assuming a voluntary agreement and fair and effective representation by the
union, I see only the loss of the right to proceed from a losing arbitration to a
second chance in a court as a basis for employees' opposition. But why
should an employee have, if not two bites at the apple, a bite at each of two
apples (contract and statute) in two different forums? By hypothesis the
arbitrator has been empowered to entertain both the contractual and the
statutory claims, the substantive content is essentially the same, and the
remedies available in arbitration match those available in court. Finally, the
odds are the losing grievant in arbitration will have even less of a chance to
win in a court action.95
Neither the labor nor the management community benefits by the
prolonging of litigation. It is a waste of the time, money, and other resources
of unions, employers, and employees-not to mention society at large-to
allow grievants to move from one tribunal to another for a de novo hearing
simply because they are dissatisfied with the first results. Prejudicial errors
of law in an arbitration could be corrected through limited judicial review.96
Otherwise, one proceeding that meets due process standards should be
enough.9
7
93 See supra text at notes 64-68.
94 See supra text at notes 69-72.
95 See supra text at notes 46-50. Harrell Alexander was the plaintiff in the Supreme
Court's landmark Gardner-Denver decision that established the right of a losing grievant
in contract arbitration to proceed to court on a statutory claim. On remand, Alexander
fared no better than he had in arbitration. A federal district judge found his discharge was
"for cause unrelated to race" and dismissed his complaint. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 1974 WL 298, at *2 (D. Colo. Nov. 19. 1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 503 (10th Cir. 1975).
9 6 See supra text at note 87.
97 Some persons might suggest that the ideal solution would be to give employees
the option of either arbitration or court action. Employers are unlikely to agree, especially
in nonunion settings and probably in collective bargaining situations as well. Workers
with routine claims will choose arbitration, while higher-ranking employees, with a
chance for a large dollar recovery, will choose the court route. The appeal for employers
in authorizing arbitrators to handle all discrimination claims and to provide the full range
of statutory remedies for statutory violations is the desire to escape costly court suits and
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Ideology, and not a sober appraisal of the facts and their practical
implications, seems in the end the major obstacle to an acceptance of
mandatory arbitration, even when it is coupled with adequate procedural
safeguards.98 The apparent plight of the isolated individual employee makes
understandable the continuing resistance to an employer's conditioning a job
on the employee's agreement to arbitrate all employment disputes, including
statutory claims. Indeed, I too would reverse my position if the various early
studies on the advantages of arbitration for employees were refuted by later
research. 99 In the unionized setting, with effective representation readily
available, the likelihood of refutation is slim. The skeptical attitude toward
arbitration and union representation reflected in Gardner-Denver is
outmoded.' 00 Gilmer's advanced view, approving waiver of the judicial
forum, is far more appropriate in the collective bargaining context.
the wrath of emotionally aroused juries. Rich payoffs are much more often generated by
professional or executive personnel with substantial financial claims who can afford the
best lawyers. See supra notes 46, 90 and accompanying text.
98 Opponents can point to certain horrific examples of overcharging arbitrators or
arbitral systems that amount to stacked decks in favor of the employer. But these aberrant
defects are always subject to judicial correction. See supra notes 75-76 and
accompanying text.
99 See supra text at notes 43, 46-50.
100 Overruling Gardner-Denver is unnecessary. It is clearly distinguishable on the
grounds the arbitrator there had not been authorized to entertain statutory claims and the
union had not "clearly and unmistakably" waived employees' right to sue in court.
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